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NOTES
"When in Nome ....": Custom, Culture
and the Objective Standard in Alaskan
Adverse Possession Law
This note considers the Alaska Supreme Court's apparent
standard for resolving adverse possession disputes after the
decision in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom. The Fagerstrom case
presented the court with a distinctly Alaskan fact-pattern involving
a claim made by a Native couple to a rural parcel of property.
The court held that the Native couple had established title to the
land by adverse possession. This note criticizes the court's
decision on three grounds: 1) that the lenient objective standard
adopted by the court fails to fulfill the purposes underlying the
adverse possession doctrine; 2) that the court's use of custom to
establish legal title was unsatisfactory; and 3) that the policy
ramifications of the Fagerstrom decision are undesirable. This
note concludes that the court should adopt a more stringent,
objective standard for determining adverse possession in order to
sufficiently protect the value of legal title.
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of adverse possession is not usually viewed as one
of the more controversial bodies of law. In fact, Professor Epstein
has called adverse possession "a problem solved."' Underlying this
statement is the idea that the modem police force has supplanted
self-help and legal action as the dominant form of protection for
private property rights.2 As a result, it has been argued, the
doctrine of adverse possession has been increasingly applied to
Copyright © 1994 by Alaska Law Review
1. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law
of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 693 (1986).
2. Id. at 692.
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"insignificant" issues such as backyard boundary disputes and
zoning controversies? However, due to such factors as its vast
land area and severe and uncertain climate, Alaska has found it
difficult to provide many remote areas with adequate law enforce-
ment.4 Thus, the argument that adverse possession is a "problem
solved" may not apply to the peculiar circumstances under which
Alaska law develops; self-help and legal action may still be the
primary methods for resolving property disputes, especially in rural
areas of the state.
In Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, the Alaska Supreme Court dealt
with an adverse possession case in rural Alaska. Fagerstrom
involved a situation in which a Native couple, the Fagerstroms,
occupied and used, during summer months, a rural parcel of land
for more than a decade. Their use was confined to recreational
and subsistence activities. The land in dispute was owned by a
private land-holding partnership, Nome 2000. The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the Fagerstroms had established title to the land by
adverse possession. Specifically, the court held that (1) the
Fagerstroms' use of the parcel was sufficient to establish continu-
ous, notorious and exclusive possession pursuant to the established
law in Alaska6 and (2) what the Fagerstroms believed with respect
3. Id. at 692-93; R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61
WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 333 (1983).
4. See, e.g., TERESA W. CARNS ET AL., RESOLVING DIsPuTEs LOCALLY: A
STATEWIDE REPORT AND DIRECTORY 18 (1993).
5. 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990).
6. See, e.g., Alaska Nat'l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977)
(stating that for adverse possession to have occurred "(1) the possession must have
been continuous and uninterrupted; (2) the possessor must have acted as if he
were the owner and not merely one acting with the permission of the owner; and
(3) the possession must have been reasonably visible to the record owner"). These
requirements apply to both of the adverse possession statutes in Alaska. The
Fagerstrom case was brought pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 09.10.030, which
provides:
No person may bring an action for the recovery of real property, or for
the recovery of the possession of it unless commenced within 10 years.
No action may be maintained for the recovery unless it appears that the
plaintiff, an ancestor, a predecessor, or the grantor of the plaintiff was
seized or possessed of the premises in question within 10 years before the
commencement of the action.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1983).
Alaska's other adverse possession statute differs in that it applies to situations
where the claim is brought under color and claim of title. It provides, in relevant
part, that: "[t]he uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real property under
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to their ownership of the land was immaterial to the question of
hostility.7 The court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would be
inconsistent with precedent and patently unfair."'
The "black letter" law of adverse possession generally supports
the Alaska Supreme Court's position that subjective elements do
not factor into adverse possession analysis. The pervasive view
regarding claims of adverse possession is that "what the possessor
believes or intends should have nothing to do with it."9  The
objective test for determining adverse possession is supposed to
focus on how an "average owner" would use the land, so as to
provide for the greatest degree of societal stability by establishing
a workable test for settling title.'° However, the way in which this
proposition has been applied by various courts is a different matter.
A 1983 survey conducted by a University of Chicago law professor
concludes that courts are often willing to recognize subjective
factors in determining whether an adverse possessor has acquired
title:" the implication is that the law of adverse possession is
becoming less objective, and is thus potentially sacrificing the
stability that the doctrine was intended to provide to society.
The court's re-affirmance of an objective analysis in Fager-
strom stands in contrast to the court's implicit adoption of certain
subjective factors. These factors were part of the "objective
standard" the court used when it found the Natives' traditional and
customary system of land use sufficient to establish title in Alaska.
The Native system of land use is not a matter of ownership, but all
members of a particular social group in an area have equal access
to the land." This recognition of Native custom may be one
reason why the Fagerstrom decision has been viewed as an "exotic
color and claim of title for seven years or more is conclusively presumed to give
title to the property except as against the state or the United States." ALASKA
STAT. § 09.25.050(a) (Supp. 1993).
7. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 310.
8. Id.
9. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at 761
(1984).
10. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession §§ 1, 2 (1986).
11. Helmholz, supra note 3, at 332. While Helmholz does not necessarily
advocate subjective analysis under the law, he does question the objective test's
use as a factor for determining title by adverse possession: he sees an acceptance
of subjective analysis in practice. Id.
12. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 310.
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solution."' 3 Nevertheless, due to the uniquely undeveloped and
barren nature of the disputed land in Fagerstrom, the claimants'
arguments in favor of adverse possession had some merit. As a
factual matter, a lesser degree of possession is needed to establish
adverse possession of lands which could be considered wilder-
ness.
14
This note concludes that the Alaska Supreme Court, by
accepting customary use as sufficient for establishing legal title to
land in Alaska, lowered the standard for determining the elements
of adverse possession too greatly in Fagerstrom. In reaching this
conclusion, part II of this note reviews the justifications for adverse
possession and the requirements for the claims under Alaska
doctrine. The Fagerstrom decision itself is analyzed in part III.
Part IV examines the role that custom plays in the context of
adverse possession doctrine, and part V analyzes the implications
of the court's decision in Fagerstrom.
Three arguments will be presented in support of the conclu-
sions of this note: (1) that the lenient objective standard adopted
by the court fails to fulfill the purposes behind the elements
required for establishing adverse possession; (2) that custom is
unsatisfactory as a basis for establishing legal title, because where
there is the potential for cultural misperception, the more stringent
cultural standard must be applied in order to ensure that all
potential parties could be put on actual notice of the adverse claim;
and (3) that the policy ramifications of Fagerstrom are undesirable.
II. THE ADVERSE POSSESSION DOCTRINE
A. Justifications for Adverse Possession
At first glance, the doctrine of adverse possession appears to
be an anomaly in the law of property. There is something that
"feels" inherently unjust about allowing title to transfer as a result
of "wrongful" possession. To the untrained eye, adverse possession
appears to be something akin to theft. However, the doctrine rests
13. Telephone Interview with Joseph J. Perkins, Jr., Shareholder, Guess &
Rudd, Anchorage, Alaska (Aug. 30, 1993).
14. WILLIAM F. WALSH, TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION, CONTEMPORARY
LAW PAMPHLETS SERIEs 1, No. 19, 12 (1939). Generally, a lesser degree of
ownership is required for wild, undeveloped lands because the usual acts of
possession such as making improvements and cultivating the soil are "impossible
or unreasonable." Id.
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upon a societal judgment that the need for security of title to land
outweighs whatever injustice may result from an adverse possession
claim."5 Historically, adverse possession statutes in the United
States have been derived from English laws on the subject. The
doctrine of adverse possession was developed in England because
of the need for order and security within the realm of the king-
dom.16 This need for order and security has continued to serve as
the justification for the doctrine.
1. The Need to Quiet Title. The primary purpose of the
adverse possession doctrine is to bar stale claims and quiet title to
estates.17 Statutes recognizing this rationale date back as far as
the thirteenth century. 8 These laws are based on the belief that
claims to land grow stale as time passes, and the costs to society of
determining original title simply become too great.19 Thus, once
the statute of limitations runs, an older claim of title is fully
extinguished and title is vested in the adverse possessor. The
statutes generally serve both a procedural purpose (acting as a bar
against an action by the title holder) and a substantive purpose
(affirmatively vesting title in the adverse claimant)."
2. Rewarding the Productive User. A second justification for
adverse possession is that it acts as a reward for the person who
makes use of land.2' This concept rests on the premise that
productive use of land is a quality most societies seek to pro-
mote.' Alaska has incorporated this idea into its property law by
choosing to apply an objective standard to adverse possession
claims which looks at whether the claimant's actions on the land
were sufficient to give the record holder notice.' This test both
15. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1012[3] (P.
Rohan rev. ed., 1986).
16. Epstein, supra note 1, at 675.
17. WALSH, supra note 14, at 4-5.
18. POWELL, supra note 15, at 1012[1].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 9, § 11.7, at 764.
22. Id.
23. E.g., Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Alaska 1980) (holding that "[tihe
proper determination of whether the required degree of hostility exists is whether
the acts of the claimant are the acts of an owner, sufficient to give the record
owner notice of the possessor's claim."); Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout
Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831 (Alaska 1974) (stating that "'possession... need only
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promotes productivity and serves to give notice to the record title
holder that his or her land is being held adversely.
3. Punishing the Absent Title Holder. In connection with the
previous justification, adverse possession can also be seen as a
punishment for landowners who fail to utilize their land productive-
ly24 This idea apparently comes from the English civil law, as it
has been remarked that "'English lawyers regard not the merit of
the possessor, but the demerit of the one out of possession.""
The focus here is on whether the actions of the title holder are
inconsistent with societal norms regarding land use. Loss of title,
however, may be viewed as too harsh a punishment for a property
owner's mere lack of diligence and may, alternatively, be more
positively viewed as rewarding the productive land user and
quieting title to disputed property.26
4. Internalization Theory. A final justification for adverse
possession was suggested by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
stated that by working a parcel of land, that parcel "takes root in
[one's] being and cannot be torn away without [resentment]."27
Holmes stated that the basis for this acquisition of title "is in the
nature of man's mind" and that "[tihe law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man."' This notion of
one's soul becoming intermixed with the soil of the land strays far
from an objective analysis, however, and receives little or no
support in modern writings.
B. The Operation of Adverse Possession in Alaska
Early case law on adverse possession in Alaska established that
the applicable legislative enactments are to be considered statutes
of repose, by which a cause of action for ejectment is extinguished
after the prescribed interval of time. 9 The Alaska adverse
be a type of possession which would characterize an owner's use') (quoting
Norgard v. Busher, 349 P.2d 490, 496 (Or. 1960)).
24. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 9, § 11.7, at 764.
25. Epstein, supra note 1, at 677 (quoting Henry W. Ballantine, Title by
Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918)).
26. See supra parts Il.A.2 & II.A.1, respectively.
27. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897).
28. Id.
29. See Roberts v. Jaeger, 5 Alaska 190, 191 (D. Alaska 1914).
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possession statutes set the length of the relevant intervals at either
seven or ten years, depending on whether the claimant can
establish color or claim of title.3" The claimant must show that his
or her possession was adverse throughout the full period of time;
otherwise the title holder's possession of the property will be
constructively re-established.31 So long as the claimant maintains
the adverse possession, however, the legal title holder will be
considered ousted from possession.
Establishing title by adverse possession for the full statutory
time period is by no means easy. Generally, adverse possession is
not a favored means of acquiring title to land.32 The Alaska
Supreme Court has stated that the party seeking to establish title
by adverse possession bears the burden of proving each element by
"clear and convincing evidence."33 In so doing, the court asserted
that, as a policy matter, "[w]e hereby adopt that more stringent
standard because of our desire to foster reliance on record title and
enhance marketability."34 Additionally, the court has explicitly set
out five requirements that the claimant must satisfy to establish
adverse possession.35 These requirements, which are discussed in
30. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1983); id. § 09.25.050 (Supp. 1993). The
shorter period of time permitted, where color and claim of title can be established,
is in recognition that one who holds land under these conditions will be more
likely to make improvements to the property. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist
Church, Inc., 466 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska 1970). Color and claim of title also give
the adverse possessor a stronger claim against the legal title holder. Thus, the
equities will be balanced between the two sides in a shorter period of time. For
a general discussion of the element of time in the law of property, see Epstein,
supra note 1.
31. Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579, 581-82 (Alaska 1969);
Ringstad v. Grannis, 171 F.2d 170, 173-74 (9th Cir. 1948) (reasoning that "the
possession must be continuous for the statutory period in order to prevent the
original owner's possession from constructively attaching to the land, thus starting
the statute running anew").
32. See Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 CONN. B.J.
303,305 (1992). ("[I]n proceedings invoking a claim of title by adverse possession,
every presumption runs in favor of the holder of legal title, and none against
him.").
33. Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389,391-92 (Alaska 1982). The court has stated
that for "clear and convincing proof" to be shown "there must be induced a belief
that the truth of the asserted facts is highly probable." Saxton v. Harris, 395 P.2d
71, 72 (Alaska 1964).
34. Curran, 657 P.2d at 391.
35. E.g., Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830
(Alaska 1974).
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turn below, are that the possession must be actual, open and
notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile.36
1. Actual Possession. Of the elements necessary for
establishing adverse possession, actual possession of the land is
perhaps the most significant. Actual possession by an adverse
claimant divests the legal title holder of any constructive possession
gained from holding that title and begins the running of the statute
of limitations on the legal title holder's claim.37 While actual
possession over the term of the statute of limitations is not by itself
sufficient to establish adverse possession, it is procedurally an
essential element in beginning the statute of limitations. Actual
possession is also substantively essential, providing visible notice to
a title holder that the land has been occupied in a hostile manner.
The issue of actual possession is often the determinative
element decided by the trier of fact as to whether there has been
a sufficient showing by the adverse claimant to establish title. The
requisite degree of actual possession is dependent upon the
characteristics of the land in dispute.3 Obviously, a party in
possession of a parcel of commercial real estate in the city of
Anchorage will undertake different actions with respect to the
property than will a party possessing a rural plot on the banks of
the Nome River. There is no specific formula stating how much
evidence of possession is enough. Rather, the issue often will be
determined by whether the trier of fact can be persuaded that the
title holder should have been put on notice by the adverse
claimant's actions in light of the surrounding circumstances. Thus,
the level of proof necessary for showing adverse possession differs
depending on a parcel's characteristics.
Certain decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court provide a
glimpse of the type of factors used to determine actual possession.
In Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council,39 an elderly
Tlingit man was awarded title to a rural piece of property that he
36. Id.
37. See Tyee Consol. Mining Co. v. Langstedt, 136 F. 124, 128 (9th Cir. 1905)
(stating that "'seisin and possession is [sic] coextensive with [a title holder's] right,
and continues till he is ousted thereof by an actual adverse possession"') (quoting
United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 743 (1832)).
38. See, e.g., Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769,776 (Alaska 1977) ("The same acts
are not required for uninhabited and forested land as for urban lots.").
39. 519 P.2d 826 (Alaska 1974).
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had maintained over a forty year period.4" The factual evidence
of possession in that case was quite extensive. Peters, the adverse
possessor, was able to prove that there were several cabins in
various stages of repair on the land, that he had cleared the
adjacent beach of rocks and maintained it in that condition, and
that he had also constructed a smokehouse, a seal-skinning bench
and a well.41 There was also evidence of at least one boundary
post that at some time had a sign indicating that it was Peters'
property.42 Finally, Peters testified that he drove out to the
property every weekend and that he and his family "never
stop[ped] seal hunting" on the land.43 The court found Peters'
actions sufficient to establish actual possession of the land and,
therefore, focused its analysis on the exclusivity and hostility
requirements of adverse possession."
Three years later in Alaska National Bank v. Linck, 5 the
court considered another claim of adverse possession of a rural
parcel. The appellee, Linck, had brought an action to quiet title,
claiming that she had adversely possessed the land. The trial court
ruled in favor of Linck, and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.46
Linck showed that her claim of possession was based upon a
number of factors. Linck had kept the property clear of litter and
had used a substantial plot as a garden.47 More significantly, she
had constructed a barricade to prevent others from crossing the
property and had posted a sign prohibiting trespassing for hunting
purposes." Additionally, Linck had negotiated a transaction
granting an easement for power lines to be placed upon the
property.49 In light of this evidence, the court found that Linck
established actual possession over the rural property.0
40. Id. at 827-28.
41. Id. at 828.
42. Id. at 828-29.
43. Id. at 828 n.6.
44. The court held that Peters' use of the disputed land was both exclusive and
hostile and, therefore, that adverse possession was established. Id. at 831-32. For
a further discussion of the exclusivity analysis in Peters, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 69-75 and 151-58.
45. 559 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1977).
46. Id. at 1054.
47. Id. at 1051.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1052.
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A case decided just five months after Linck provides an
interesting contrast. In Shilts v. Young,51 the appellee, Young, had
brought an action to quiet title to approximately 80 acres of land.
Shilts, the legal title holder, conceded that Young had adversely
possessed most of the parcel but counterclaimed for possession of
240,000 square feet of the 80 acres, asserting that Young lacked
"actual possession" of that portion of the land. 2  Evidence
showed that the relevant local community believed that Young was
the owner of the land and that he had previously been approached
by a logging company to discuss a sale of the parcel.53 However,
Young's activity on the land was minimal at best. Young stated
that he flew over the property ten to fifty times per year, and he
annually walked around what he believed were the boundaries.
5 4
The court found it notable that Young had "never fenced the
boundaries of the land, [or] made any improvements or posted
signs on the land indicating his ownership or warning trespass-
ers." 55 Based on these findings of fact, the court ruled that Young
could not establish adverse possession to the disputed 240,000
square foot parcel.56
The above examples are intended only to provide a glimpse of
the type of factors that the court has used to determine actual
possession. As noted earlier, no set formula or specific type of
evidence is considered essential to determining whether there is
actual possession. Similarly, the above examples are not intended
to be an exclusive list of the type of evidence the court will
consider. It is evident, however, that factors relevant to the
determination of "actual possession" include the presence of
enclosed boundaries, permanent structures and improvements, signs
indicating a warning to trespassers, and evidence of clearing and
maintaining the property.
2. Open and Notorious Possession. Another requirement of
adverse possession is that it must be open and notorious.57 The
possession must be of such a nature that if the title holder were to
51. 567 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1977).
52. Id. at 771.
53. Id. at 772.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 777.
57. E.g., Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830
(Alaska 1974).
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visit the property, she would be put on notice that it is necessary to
assert her ownership rights.58 This requirement is related to that
of actual possession, in that it relies on there being some visible
evidence of possession on the property. The characteristics of the
land in dispute, and thus the uses to which the land can be put, also
affect whether the possession can be classified as open and
notorious. As the Alaska Supreme Court stated in Linck, "[w]e
cannot expect the possessor of uninhabited and forested land to do
what the possessor of urban residential land would do before we
charge the record owner with notice."59 In general, an adverse
claimant in a semi-wilderness area may make less of an open
showing of possession and still successfully maintain an adverse
possession action.
One's reputation in the community regarding the ownership of
property is also a relevant, although by no means controlling, factor
for proving open and notorious possession.' The rationale for
allowing reputation to be considered as substantive evidence is that
if the possession of an adverse claimant is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and discussed by the community, then the record
title holder should at least be put on constructive notice.6'
Reputation alone, however, is also not dispositive on the open and
notorious issue. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court in Shilts
denied transfer of title under adverse possession, although, the
claimant was reputed to be the owner of the property.62
Whether the adverse claimant paid taxes on the property is
also a factor that the Alaska courts will consider in determining
notoriety. The rationale is that payment of taxes establishes a
record with the tax assessor, which would indicate ownership of the
property to a third party attempting to find the true owner.63 This
factor is limited, however, by its lack of physical visibility. Thus,
the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that payment of taxes is only
a factor to be considered in connection with a visible physical
presence on the land.'
58. Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., 658 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska 1983).
59. Alaska Nat'l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Alaska 1977).
60. Id.
61. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 70 (1986).
62. Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 777 (Alaska 1977) (the denial of transfer of
title was based on Young's very minimal activity upon the property).
63. Linck, 559 P.2d at 1054.
64. Shilts, 567 P.2d at 777.
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3. Continuous Possession. The requirement that possession
be continuous in order for adverse possession to ripen into good
title is well established.65 Although actual and hostile possession
of the adverse claimant are said to divest the constructive posses-
sion of the title holder, once the continuity of the adverse posses-
sion is broken, constructive possession once again vests in the
record title holder, and the claim for adverse possession is negat-
ed.66
Continuous possession does not mean, however, that the
adverse claimant must be physically present on the property for the
full statutory period.67 Like the other requirements for establish-
ing adverse possession, continuity is considered by the courts in
light of the characteristics of the land in dispute. The test estab-
lished by the Alaska Supreme Court is "whether the adverse
possessor has used and enjoyed the land as 'an average owner of
similar property would use and enjoy it."'" In other words, if the
nature of the land is such that it cannot reasonably be used
throughout the entire year, then the possession need only cover the
portion of the year during which the land is usable. Thus, for a
rural parcel of land in Alaska, which may be uninhabitable for a
significant amount of time during the year, an adverse claimant
may have to show adverse possession only for a relatively short
period of time-for example, three months.69
4. Exclusive Possession. The exclusivity requirement tends
to work in conjunction with the hostility requirement (discussed in
the next subsection) in establishing adverse possession. By
excluding others, including the record title holder of the property,
the adverse claimant gives clear evidence to the rest of the world
that he intends to appropriate the land. The Alaska Supreme
Court stated in Peters7 that "[a]n owner would have no reason to
65. E.g., Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830
(Alaska 1974).
66. Ringstad v. Grannis, 171 F.2d 170, 173-74 (9th Cir. 1948); Linck, 559 P.2d
at 1052.
67. Linck, 559 P.2d at 1052.
68. Id. (quoting 3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.3, at 765 (A. J. Casner ed.,
1952)).
69. This was the case in Fagerstrom, which will be discussed further below. See
infra part III.
70. 519 P.2d 826 (Alaska 1974).
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believe that a person was making a claim of ownership inconsistent
with his own if that person's possession was not exclusive, but in
participation with the owner or with the general public."71
This does not mean, however, that the possession of the
adverse claimant must be absolutely exclusive. Consistent with the
other requirements for establishing title by adverse possession, the
exclusivity requirement is considered in light of the way in which
an average owner would make use of the property.7' Inevitably,
the finder of fact in an adverse possession case will therefore need
to make a subjective estimate of how hospitable the "average
owner" would be with regard to allowing others to use his or her
land.
In Peters, for example, the court found that allowing the
general public to use the land for clamdigging did not destroy the
exclusivity of possession, because "Peters was merely acting as any
other hospitable landowner might."'73 The court so held despite
the fact that there was no evidence that other owners of similar
land in the community acted in a like manner. Ultimately, the
court's determination of exclusivity appears to have turned on
whether Peters believed that his rights as a property owner were
infringed upon.74 The court stated that "[o]ccasional clamdiggers
could not destroy the exclusive character of Peters' use since such
casual intrusions were clearly not considered by Peters to interfere
or conflict with his own use."'75 By taking Peters' subjective
beliefs into account with regard to the exclusivity requirement, the
Alaska Supreme Court has shown its willingness to deviate, to a
certain extent, from a purely objective standard.
5. Hostile Possession. The hostility requirement has proved
to be the most difficult for courts to apply consistently in adverse
possession claims. Subjective factors have most frequently entered
71. Id. at 830.
72. Id. at 831; see also Norgard v. Busher, 349 P.2d 490, 496 (Or. 1960).
73. Peters, 519 P.2d at 831.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court's focus appears misplaced, however, because the require-
ments for adverse possession are justified by the notice that they give to the record
title holder. The record title holder could not reasonably be required to ascertain
whether the adverse claimant believed that there was an interference with her use.
A better option would be to ask whether an average title holder, upon taking
notice, could determine that his property was being claimed by a hostile possessor,
with exclusivity acting to give physical evidence of that fact.
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into adverse possession analyses through this requirement.
Terminology may be the reason for this problem. "Hostile
possession" seems to imply an element of ill will toward the record
title holder. However, animosity is not an accurate portrayal of
"hostility" as it is used in the adverse possession doctrine. For a
claim to be "hostile," it merely must be without the permission of
the legal title holder. 6 The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that
the purpose of the hostility requirement is to show that the adverse
claim "is not subordinate to the title of the true owner."'
The test for hostility that has been applied to claims of adverse
possession in Alaska may be characterized as "a fairly objective
one."78 The initial presumption is that a party who takes posses-
sion of property legally owned by someone else does so permissive-
ly.79 The presumption of permission is overcome by showing that
the possession was openly adverse to the owner's interests.0 Such
a showing can be made by the claimant if he proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he "acted toward the land as if he owned
it."'" Furthermore, unlike the requirements of exclusive posses-
sion, in regard to hostility the court has stated that the claimant's
"beliefs as to the true legal ownership of the land, his good faith or
bad faith in entering into possession ... all are irrelevant."'
Thus, it is the physical action of the adverse possessor toward the
land that is important. The court has summarized the significance
of the hostility requirement by stating that "[t]he whole doctrine of
adverse possession rests upon the acquiescence of the owner in the
hostile acts and claims of the person in possession." 3
6. Summary. The five requirements for establishing adverse
possession all have a common purpose: to ensure that the legal
title holder of the disputed property is put on notice of the adverse
claim.' Notice is essential because it allows the legal title holder
76. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 9, § 11.7, at 760.
77. City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Alaska 1975).
78. Peters, 519 P.2d at 832.
79. Id. at 833 (citing Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 126 (Alaska 1961);
Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579, 581 (Alaska 1969)).
80. Id. at 833.
81. Id. at 832.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 833.
84. Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., 658 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska 1983)
(citing Peters, 519 P.2d at 832).
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to "take steps to vindicate his rights by legal action." 85 The true
owner is not required to have actual notice, however; he may be
charged with knowing that which a reasonably diligent owner
should have known. 6 The Alaska courts apply a general standard
which considers whether the adverse claimant's possession and use
is the same as that of an "average owner." The "average owner"
standard must, in turn, always be considered in light of the physical
characteristics of the land, and the uses to which the land can be
put. Only when this type of possession can be established by clear
and convincing proof over the statutorily prescribed period of time
will the adverse possession ripen into legal title in Alaska.
III. ANALYSIS OF NOME 2000 v. FAGERSTROM
The Alaska Supreme Court set its apparent standard for
resolving adverse possession disputes in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom.
The Fagerstrom case presented the court with an uniquely Alaskan
fact-pattern involving a claim made by a Native couple to a rural
parcel of property. The court held that the Native couple estab-
lished title to the land by adverse possession. However, the court
failed to fulfill the purposes underlying the adverse possession
doctrine when it adopted a too lenient objective standard and
misused custom to establish title.
A. Factual Background of Fagerstrom
The area of land in dispute in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom was
a parcel of approximately seven and a half acres overlooking the
Nome River in the Osborn area, a popular recreation site." The
relevant title of the land dated back to 1918, when it was patented
by the federal government to a private individual as a portion of a
mineral survey." Record title to the land changed in 1982, when
the entire area of the mineral survey was conveyed to Nome 2000,
a private land-holding partnership. 9
Between 1918 and 1982, the record title holder had no
apparent activity upon the land. The property was uninhabitable
for most of the year, and was used sparingly for subsistence and
85. Peters, 519 P.2d at 832.
86. Bentley Family Trust, 658 P.2d at 766.
87. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 306-07 (Alaska 1990).
88. Brief for Appellants at 2, Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska
1990) (No. S-3409).
89. Id.
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recreational purposes during the summer months.' The Fager-
strom family was one of the groups of people using the land
between 1918 and 1982.91 Charles Fagerstrom claimed that he
could recall camping in the surrounding area as far back as the
1940's.' He had begun moving building materials onto the
disputed parcel in the late 1960's, and in 1970 he and his wife
staked off a twelve acre parcel for the purposes of applying for a
Native Allotment.93 Two of the stakes were located on the
mineral survey, while two were not.94 The area between the
stakes, which overlapped a portion of the mineral survey, was the
land in controversy.95
Beginning in 1974, the Fagerstroms parked a camper on the
land during each summer, from June through September, until
1978, when they built a permanent cabin.9 6 In 1974, the Fagerstr-
oms also placed a lightweight outhouse and a fish rack on the land;
one year later, they planted a group of spruce saplings. 7 During
the summer of 1977, the Fagerstroms erected a reindeer pen on the
land, which was used for only one and a half months but remained
in place until 1978.98 No other fences, barricades or signs of any
kind were on the property.
The Fagerstroms used the disputed land for subsistence and
recreational activities.99 Other people also used the disputed land
for those purposes without objection from the Fagerstroms. 1°°
Mr. Fagerstrom's mother testified that no one was ever excluded
from the property because allowing free use of the land by others
was "the Eskimo way."101 Overall, the Fagerstroms spent approx-
90. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 307.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. This action was taken pursuant to the Alaska Native Allotment Act of
1906, 34 Stat. 197, amended by 70 Stat. 954 (1956), repealed by Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, § 18,43 U.S.C. § 1617(a) (1982) (with a savings clause for
applications pending on or before December 18, 1971).
94. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 307.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 307-08.
97. Id. at 307.
98. Id. at 307-08.
99. Id. at 308.
100. Id.
101. Brief for Appellants at 8, Fagerstrom (No. S-3409).
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imately thirteen weekends per year, between June and September,
on the disputed property."°
Because Nome 2000 brought suit in 1987 pursuant to Alaska's
ten-year adverse possession statute," the Fagerstroms had the
burden of proof for establishing adverse possession only from the
time period beginning in 1977. Nome 2000 stipulated that the
Fagerstroms adversely possessed a portion of the disputed land
between 1978 and 1987, and thus, the court's factual inquiry
regarding possession focused only on 1977."4
B. Arguments of the Parties in Fagerstrom
1. Nome 2000's Arguments Opposing Adverse Posses-
sion. After obtaining title to the property in 1982, Nome 2000
attempted to negotiate with the Fagerstroms to allow them to
continue using the land as a recreational site."0 When the
attempts proved unsuccessful, Nome 2000 filed a suit for ejectment.
The Fagerstroms counterclaimed by asserting that they had
acquired title to the land through adverse possession. 6 On the
factual basis presented above, the trial court denied Nome 2000's
motion for a directed verdict on the adverse possession claim, and
granted title of the entire parcel of land to the Fagerstroms °7
On appeal, Nome 2000 presented three arguments which are
relevant for the purposes of this note.' These three arguments
were that the Fagerstroms' use of the land was insufficient to
102. Id. at 5.
103. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1983).
104. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 308-09.
105. Brief for Appellants at 2, Fagerstrom (No. S-3409).
106. Id.; Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 306.
107. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 306-07.
108. In addition to the arguments against adverse possession, Nome 2000
presented two arguments concerning evidentiary matters (one asserting that certain
evidence offered by the Fagerstroms was erroneously admitted, and the other
claiming that certain evidence offered by Nome 2000 was erroneously excluded).
Id. at 311-12. Nome 2000 also argued that attorneys' fees should not have been
awarded to the Fagerstroms by the trial court. Id. at 313. The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the evidentiary rulings made by the trial court were harmless to
Nome 2000's case. Id. at 311-12. However, the court did vacate the trial court's
order regarding attorneys' fees. Id. at 313. For purposes of this note, these
aspects of Fagerstrom are irrelevant, as the focus here is on the court's consider-
ation of the primary issue, adverse possession.
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establish (1) open and notorious possession, (2) exclusive posses-
sion and (3) hostile possession. 9
First, Nome 2000 argued that the requirement of open and
notorious possession was not satisfied because there were insuffi-
cient permanent structures or other signs of improvement on the
property."0 They claimed further that the Fagerstroms' activity
on the parcel was insufficient to establish adverse possession.'
Therefore, Nome 2000 asserted that it could not have been put on
notice during 1977.
Second, Nome 2000 argued that the Fagerstroms' use of the
land was not exclusive.1 Their argument rested upon Mrs.
Fagerstrom's testimony that people were never excluded from using
the property because, according to Native custom, everyone had
the same right to use the land."3
Finally, Nome 2000 argued against finding hostile possession
by the Fagerstroms because the couple lacked the requisite intent
to establish title by adverse possession."4 Nome 2000 asserted
that the Fagerstroms used the property consistently with the
traditional system of Native Alaskan land usage, which does not
recognize ownership per se, but instead considers occupants of
parcel to be similar to stewards." 5 The implication of Nome
2000's argument was that the Fagerstroms should have been treated
no differently than other people who used the land for recreational
purposes, since nothing other than the duration of the couple's land
use distinguished them from other Natives in the area.
As an alternative to the above rationales, Nome 2000 argued
that the Fagerstroms did not actually possess all portions of the
land at issue."6 Nome 2000 asserted that even if adverse posses-
sion were found concerning certain tracts of the land, other
portions of the disputed property were not actually possessed to the
same extent."7  Thus, adverse possession should not be found
109. Id. at 309-10; Brief for Appellants at 19-24, Fagerstrom (No. S-3409).
110. Brief for Appellants at 19-20, Fagerstrom (No. S-3409).
111. Id. at 20.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 20-22.
114. Id. at 23-28.
115. Id. at 24, 28. Like stewards, Native Alaskans feel that the land is not
theirs; rather they are guardians of it. They may use the property and watch over
it, but the land is not theirs to the exclusion of all others.
116. Id. at 28-35.
117. Id. at 28-29.
318 [Vol. 11:2
ADVERSE POSSESSION
with regard to those areas of the parcel."' The Alaska Supreme
Court ultimately accepted this alternative argument, and in doing
so provided some clarification regarding what features of occupa-
tion are insufficient to establish actual possession." 9
2. The Fagerstroms' Arguments Favoring Adverse Posses-
sion. The appellees' brief focused on establishing the elements of
continuity, hostility and notoriety of possession. For each element,
the Fagerstroms were careful to stress that the land was rural;
therefore, lesser acts of dominion and control were acceptable for
establishing adverse possession. The appellees relied on the
holdings of Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council120 and
Alaska National Bank v. Linck," cases in which adverse posses-
sion was found over rural parcels of land, to establish an analogous
situation.
Arguing that there was continuous and uninterrupted use of
the land, the Fagerstroms relied on the presence of what they
considered to be "permanent improvements" to demonstrate that
use of the property was continuous over the entire time period.'"
Among the permanent improvements pointed to by the Fager-
stroms were the fish rack, non-indigenous spruce trees, the reindeer
pen and the camper. The Fagerstroms argued that these improve-
ments showed that their use of the land was the same as any
average owner."'
The Fagerstroms' argument regarding hostility followed the
same analysis as the argument supporting continuity. The couple
invoked the "average owner" test once again and cited many of the
same "permanent improvements" as evidence that the land use was
not merely permissive, but was similar to the use of an average
118. Id.
119. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 311 (Alaska 1990). Neither the
placement of cornerposts marking the boundaries nor the maintenance of existing
trails over the property were found sufficient to elevate the Fagerstroms' use of
certain tracts of the land to the status of possession. The court did not elaborate
as to what further actions would have been necessary to constitute possession of
those portions by the Fagerstroms. Id.
120. 519 P.2d 826 (Alaska 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
121. 559 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1977). See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
122. Brief for Appellees at 6-8, Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska
1990) (No. S-3409).
123. Id. at 7.
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owner. 24 Summarizing their surprisingly short hostility argument,
the Fagerstroms simply stated that "[n]o actions inconsistent with
ownership were in evidence."1"
Finally, the Fagerstroms asserted that their actions were
notorious. Once again, the "permanent improvements" placed
upon the land were offered to support this claim.126 Remarkably,
in neither this section of the argument nor in the section on
hostility did the Fagerstroms cite the testimony of others in the
Osborn area, where they were reputed to be the owners of the
property. They instead mis-cited this favorable evidence in support
of their claim that the use of the property was continuous. 27 The
Fagerstroms summarized their argument for notorious possession
simply by stating that their "claim would have been readily
apparent to appellant" based on the improvements upon the
land.1'
C. The Alaska Supreme Court's Decision
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court and held in favor of the Fagerstroms' claim of adverse
possession in regard to the portions of the property which they
found the couple to have occupied.129 Specifically, the court held
that the Fagerstroms were able to establish that their possession
was actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and hostile; thus, "all
of the elements of adverse possession were met." 3' The court
reasoned that a single test would suffice for establishing continuity,
exclusivity and hostility: whether the land was used as an average
owner of similar property would use it.131 The court stated that
a jury could "reasonably conclude" that the Fagerstroms' use of the
land passed the "average owner" test.
132
As for the remaining element of notoriety, the court consid-
ered both visibility of a physical presence on the land and commu-
nity reputation regarding ownership. The court stated that "a quick
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 9-11.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 310 (Alaska 1990).
130. Id. at 310.
131. Id. at 309-10.
132. Id.
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investigation of the premises, especially during the season which it
was best suited for use, would have been sufficient to place a
reasonably diligent landowner on notice that someone may have
been exercising dominion and control over at.least the northern
portion of the property."'133 This finding was based upon the
evidence of permanent improvements to the land during the
relevant periods of time."3 The court found that once Nome
2000 had been put on notice by the physical evidence on the
property, "further inquiry would indicate that members of the
community regarded the Fagerstroms as the owners." '35  Thus,
the court held that the Fagerstroms' possession of the property was
sufficiently notorious.'36
D. Analysis of the Court's Decision
Upon first impression, the Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning
in Fagerstrom appears to be a sound application of the adverse
possession doctrine. The court enumerated the necessary elements
for proving adverse possession, and stated that, in light of the rural
characteristics of the land, the Fagerstroms established each
element. A closer analysis of the decision, however, demonstrates
that the underlying purposes of the adverse possession doctrine
were not served.
At the outset of its analysis in Fagerstrom, the court stated that
"[w]hether a claimant's physical acts upon the land are sufficiently
... notorious and exclusive does not necessarily depend on the
existence of significant improvements, substantial activity or
absolute exclusivity."' 37 However, the court left uncertain exactly
what is necessary for establishing notorious and exclusive posses-
sion. Additionally, the court has previously stated that "mere
occupation of the premises, even for the statutory period does not
establish title."'38 Instead, the adverse possessors must offer
"'proof of a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the
owner of the property.""39 Although a lesser showing of proof
is often acceptable for rural property, some clear demonstration of
133. Id. at 310.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 309.
138. Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579, 581 (Alaska 1969).
139. Id. (quoting Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 126 (Alaska 1961)).
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actual possession must still be made or the adverse claimant can
not acquire title by adverse possession. 40 This section questions
the court's stance on the issues of (1) actual possession, (2)
notoriety and (3) exclusivity, in light of whether they were estab-
lished in a way that serves the purposes of the adverse possession
doctrine.
1. Actual Possession. The court's finding of actual possession
in Fagerstrom was based on evidence that showed little more than
customary use of the property by the Fagerstroms. The evidence
of "permanent improvements" consisted of a camper parked on the
land, an outhouse, a fish rack, a reindeer pen and a few newly
planted spruce saplings.' Additionally, the Fagerstroms' pres-
ence on the land was limited, consisting of weekends over an
annual three month period, during which time they mainly engaged
in recreational activities. 14 2
These facts present a very weak case for actual possession.
First, a camper, because of its mobility and known recreational use
suggests a lack of permanence to outside observers. Similarly, the
outhouse, which a strong wind blew over one winter,'43 could
hardly be characterized as a significant, permanent structure.
Furthermore, the fish rack and the spruce saplings could be
interpreted as improvements on the parcel in conjunction with its
recreational use, rather than as part of a permanent settlement.
This would leave the reindeer pen as the one structure on the land
indicative of a permanent improvement.
In contrast, the factors considered by the Alaska Supreme
Court for determining actual possession in Peters, Linck and Shilts
give a clearer indication of ownership.'" In those cases, the court
considered evidence such as enclosed boundaries, warning signs to
trespassers, and permanent features like cabins and the claimants'
clearing of the land. 4 ' While these items are not intended to be
an exclusive list of the evidence the court will look for, it is notable
that none of these items were present in Fagerstrom. Quite simply,
140. See Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., 658 P.2d 761,768 (Alaska 1983).
141. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 310.
142. Id. at 308.
143. Id. at 307 n.4.
144. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
145. Id.
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in Fagerstrom, the court established a significantly lower standard
for proving actual possession.
Visible signs of actual possession serve to "put the record
owner on notice of the existence of an adverse claimant, ' '146
which fulfills the basic purpose behind the elements required for
establishing adverse possession. By setting aside the need to show
evidence such as significant improvements, substantial activity and
absolute exclusivity, the Alaska Supreme Court unjustly deprived
Nome 2000 of valuable opportunities to take actual notice of an
adverse claimant. Furthermore, by weakening the standard for
notice, the court undercut the very purpose of the statute, which is
to allow the record title holder an opportunity to take legal action
to vindicate his or her rights.47
Permanent, visible improvements and substantial use of the
land also reflect an underlying intent to own the property, rather
than merely to make use of it. These are, in fact, precisely the
types of activities that courts typically consider when applying the
"average owner" test. In considering adverse possession, it is
important to keep in mind that the doctrine involves the transfer
of legal ownership-a rather drastic and severe outcome under the
law. Although the "average owner" test attempts to provide an
objective standard, the various objective manifestations are
reflections of the adverse claimant's subjective intent to be an
owner.
2. Notoriety. In theory, under the notoriety requirement the
record title holder should be able to take notice of the adverse
claimant's objective manifestations of ownership. The title holder
is then in the best position to assert his right as legal title holder or
inquire in the community about the adverse claimant's reputation
of legal ownership. Notoriety is necessary because where there are
insufficient acts to clearly show an adverse claimant's intent to own,
the legal title holder may feel little need to assert his legal claim or
make a reasonable inquiry. This appears to have been the case in
Fagerstrom, where Nome 2000 was aware that the land was being
used for recreational purposes when it bought the property, but did
not feel the need to file a suit for ejectment.
146. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830 (Alaska
1974).
147. Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977).
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Reputation within the community as to property ownership
serves to augment a reasonably notorious claim of possession, but
cannot in itself establish notoriety.'48 The court must first estab-
lish that the record title holder could have reasonably believed that
an adverse possessor was attempting to establish dominion and
control over the property. The decision to inquire about reputation
would never arise without a reasonably clear showing of another
party's existing intent to own.
Ultimately though, because the court focused its inquiry solely
on evidence of usage, rather than on the actions reflecting
ownership, Nome 2000 lost title. In this sense, the Alaska Supreme
Court's reliance upon the Fagerstroms' reputation in the communi-
ty as being the owners of the land was misplaced. Without some
evidence of significant improvements or substantial use, it is
difficult to see why a record title holder would inquire into
reputation because there would be no reason to believe that
another party was attempting to establish adverse possession. In
Fagerstrom, however, a showing of mere use was deemed sufficient
to lead into evidence of reputation. This focus on use fails to fulfill
the purpose of the notoriety requirement.
3. Exclusivity. In its analysis of exclusivity in Fagerstrom,
the Alaska Supreme Court also improperly emphasized the mere
use of land. As previously noted, the purpose of the exclusivity
requirement is to give notice to the record title holder that an
adverse claimant is acting upon the title holder's land as would an
actual owner. Implicit in the exclusivity requirement is the idea
that the right to exclude others from property is an essential
feature of ownership. In Fagerstrom, the court stated that absolute
exclusivity need not be shown, but only such exclusivity as an
average owner would maintain based on the characteristics of the
land.'49 The court offered little further analysis of the exclusivity
of the Fagerstroms' "possession" of the disputed parcel, stating only
that allowing others to pick berries and fish on the property was
"consistent with the conduct of a hospitable land owner."'15 For
this proposition, the court relied on Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl
Scout Council in determining the issue of exclusivity."'
148. E.g., id.
149. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990).
150. Id. at 310.
151. Id.
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The Peters case is distinguishable, however, because of the
degree of notice that was afforded to the record title holder despite
other people's use of the land. In Peters, the adverse claimant used
the disputed land for repairing boats, hunting and subsistence
activities.'52 The exclusivity of his claim was challenged based on
other's recreational clamdigging on the property. 53 The court
held that such use did not destroy the exclusivity of Peters' claim,
as he was merely acting as a hospitable landowner would act."
In other words, it would have been clear to the record title holder
that a dominant party was making use of the property as an owner
would (for subsistence), while others were using the land for an
entirely different activity (recreation), presumably with permission.
The facts presented in Fagerstrom are only slightly, yet
significantly, different from those in Peters. The Fagerstrom court
stated that the couple used the property "to fish, gather berries,
clean the premises, and play."' 55  At the same time, however,
others were also free to come onto the property for the very same
purposes-namely to fish, pick berries and play.'56 The only
distinction may have been that the Fagerstroms cleaned the
premises, but the court later in its opinion held that cleaning the
property "would not provide the reasonably diligent owner with
visible evidence of another's exercise of dominion and control.', 157
Thus, the Fagerstroms' activities on the land were indistinguishable
from the activities engaged in by others, and neither set of activities
clearly exhibited an intent to own. Instead, a reasonably diligent
owner would observe a number of people similarly engaged in
recreational activity upon the land, with little distinction among
them. Such an owner would feel little or no need to assert his or
her legal rights to the property. The Alaska Supreme Court has
recognized this point, stating in Peters that "[a]n owner would have
no reason to believe that a person was making a claim of owner-
ship inconsistent with his own if that person's possession was not
152. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 828 (Alaska
1974).
153. Id. at 830.
154. Id. at 831. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
weakened objective standard applied to the issue of exclusivity in Peters).
155. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 310.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 311.
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exclusive, but in participation with ... the general public. 158
Thus, the court's standard for determining exclusivity ultimately
fails to fulfill the purpose of providing sufficient notice to the
record title holder.
4. Conclusion. There is an inherent dilemma in adverse
possession cases regarding rural or semi-wilderness property. On
the one hand, because of the nature of the land, the adverse
claimant cannot reasonably be expected to exert the same degree
of possession over the property as one would expect in a more
developed area. However, if the standards of proof are made too
lenient the record title holder Will receive insufficient notice as to
when he should assert his legal rights. Additionally, it must be
remembered that adverse possession is a disfavored remedy at law,
and the requirements are to be applied strictly, with all presump-
tions running in favor of the record title holder. 9
In Fagerstrom, the Alaska Supreme Court squarely confronted
this dilemma. The result reached by the court, however, drastically
lowered the threshold for proving possession of property by
allowing evidence of mere customary use to be sufficient to
establish adverse possession, regardless of any showing of an intent
to own. The "average owner" test becomes more akin to an
"average user" standard. Under this reduced standard, the court
recognized the Native Alaskan system of land use as sufficient to
establish the elements of adverse possession. Thus, arguably, the
court has instituted custom as a means of acquiring title.
IV. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM
A. Recognition of Custom as a Basis for Law
The test that the Alaska Supreme Court purportedly relied
upon in Fagerstrom was an examination of whether the Fager-
stroms used the land as an "average owner" would.16° Naturally,
such a standard raises the question of what, or who, is meant by an
158. Peters, 519 P.2d at 830; see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,711-
12 (1986) (discussing exclusivity as "the most important characteristic of private
property," and the paradox of "public property," stating that "things left open to
the public are not property at all, but rather its antithesis").
159. Mascolo, supra note 32, at 305.
160. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 309.
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"average owner." Consideration of the location and characteristics
of the parcel of land in dispute provides some clarification. That
frame of reference will assist in determining how an average
member of the community would use such land in order to put it
to the most beneficial use for society, and in turn, establish a claim
of title in that person.
There are still some ambiguities, however. What if there is no
relevant community to use as a frame of reference, as may be the
case with rural, semi-wilderness property? What if a parcel's
characteristics do not make it particularly adaptable to private
ownership, thereby failing to establish any norm of an "average
owner," but instead best suit the land for public use? What if the
adverse claimant is from another culture with different customs
regarding land use, and thus utilizes the land in a way usually
sufficient to establish ownership, but according to the surrounding
community, insufficient to exhibit an intent to own the land? Each
of these questions can be raised with regard to the facts of
Fagerstrom. It is this combination of the rural characteristics of the
land and the confrontation of cultures that makes Fagerstrom a
uniquely Alaskan dispute.
The resolution which the Alaska Supreme Court reached in
Fagerstrom relied upon custom as a basis for the objective standard
embodied in the "average owner" test. Professor Epstein states
that "[t]he great attractiveness of common custom [as a source of
ownership rights] is that it purports to place the law of property on
a firmer footing by referring it back to something other than the
assertions of the judges."16' The Alaska courts have not stated
a clear definition of what can be considered custom. However, a
long-standing general definition that the United States Supreme
Court has suggested is that "custom" is a practice which through its
universality and antiquity, has acquired the force and effect of law
with respect to the subject matter to which it relates.162 To a
certain extent, one can argue that our system of law acts to
institutionalize long-standing customs of interaction in our society.
Thus, an interesting aspect of the court's decision in Fager-
strom is the custom that it chose to recognize as a basis for the
161. Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221,
1231 (1979).
162. Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 (1838).
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objective "average owner" standard. 63 Confronted with two
distinct cultural systems of land use, the court accepted the Native
Alaskan way of life (with its notions that people do not own land
exclusively and that everyone should be able to enjoy a parcel) as
a sufficient reference point for considering ownership. The court
showed its reliance on Native custom when it found the Fager-
stroms' "ownership" sufficient to establish adverse possession. The
court's willingness to defer to Native Alaskan custom is particularly
surprising in light of the attitudes implicit in other recent decisions
that seem hostile to Native claims."6 Ultimately, if we are to
ensure that the purposes and policies of the adverse possession
doctrine are adequately served, we ,must determine what role
custom should play in the law.
At common law, courts had limited powers for dealing with
violations of property rights. They could either award damages to
the aggrieved party or demand the return of land. 6 Without
broader administrative remedies, courts looked to develop doctrines
which defined rights along more "natural" lines.'66 This inquiry
provided general principles applicable to all members of the
community.67 Furthermore, the local customs were easy for the
courts to apply.'6 In this sense, the use of custom appears to be
consistent with the idea that the particular characteristics of the
land and local reputation are relevant factors to be considered in
evaluating an adverse possession claim.
Local convention could in fact override the common law in
feudal England, where members of local communities could assert
"customs of the manor" as valid law.169  To achieve this status,
163. The court's need to choose between two distinct customs implicates the
weakness of using custom as a source of law due to its lack of universality. See
infra text accompanying notes 181-88.
164. See, e.g., Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229,
1243 (Alaska 1992) (Moore, J., concurring). Justice Moore stated that the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act "constitutes an express indication of Congress' will
that, with the sole exception of the Metlakatla Indian Community, any sovereign
status held by Alaska Native groups prior to 1971 be terminated." Id.; In re F.P.,
843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992) (holding that the state has exclusive jurisdiction over
matters involving the custody of Native children, thus denying concurrent
jurisdiction to Native villages).
165. Epstein, supra note 161, at 1222.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1222-23.
168. Id.
169. Rose, supra note 158, at 740.
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the customary claim had to be shown to have existed from a time
before memory, and had to be well defined and reasonable.7 0
Unlike the typical adverse possession case, however, such custom-
ary claims were generally asserted on behalf of the community as
a whole, and lacked the exclusivity that typifies the establishment
of an individual title to property.1
7
'
By referring back to the theories of entitlement, one can see
the way in which custom relates to establishing individual title by
adverse possession.12 One of the justifications for allowing
adverse possession is that it rewards the party who puts the land to
productive use. To determine what productive use means in a
particular community, it is necessary to look at the way in which
land is customarily used in that locale. The typical use in a
community reflects the shared underlying values held toward the
type of productivity needed to establish title. Thus, custom is in
fact a necessary element of an objective standard, for it is perhaps
the most visible means of determining how land would be used by
an "average owner."
A federal district court in Alaska long ago indicated a
willingness to take notice of custom in the property law area. In
Johnson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co.,' 7" the District Court of Alaska
stated that in land disputes involving Native Alaskans it was
important to note that:
[T]he natives of this country by their peculiar habits live in
villages here and there, in some of which they remain most of
the year and in others during certain summer months; that while
their habits are somewhat migratory, they have well-settled
places of abode, and these usually are not abandoned, though
they may vacate them for a few months at a time."
The implication is that the Alaska courts will at times recognize
special circumstances regarding the "peculiar habits" of the Native
population. 5 The Alaska Supreme Court, itself, has shown this
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra part II.A.
173. 2 Alaska 224 (D. Alaska 1904).
174. Id. at 239.
175. However, the Johnson court also noted that "it is evident that Congress
never intended that the natives of Alaska could become the owners of town lots
... or that they could acquire title to lands in any other way." Id. at 241 (emphasis
added).
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willingness to recognize Native lifestyles in previous decisions when
considering adverse possession claims. 76
Custom has not gained greater general acceptance in Ameri-
can law for several reasons. United States courts in the early part
of this century became reluctant to consider custom as a basis of
law because of the tendency of local conventions to benefit
members of certain communities over others.'77 There were also
concerns about the potential of the public at-large to make law
through custom, which could thus supplant the law-making function
of elected legislatures.'78
There are also more fundamental reasons why custom is an
unsatisfactory basis for establishing property rights. One difficulty
is that custom merely provides a general framework for considering
the law; it cannot determine the many fine details that may arise in
legal doctrines, especially with respect to a highly fact-driven
concept such as adverse possession.'79 A further set of rules is
required to resolve specific situations that will undoubtedly
develop.'
A more significant problem is that no custom is universal to all
parties." This is visible in Fagerstrom, where the opposing
parties followed distinctly different customs regarding land use, and
thus one disputant would inevitably be bound by a foreign practice.
The element of notice in adverse possession is also implicated, as
it would be unreasonable to hold a record title holder responsible
for recognizing all cultures' varied objective manifestations of
ownership.
In his book Changes in the Land, William Cronon provides an
insightful historical discussion of how cultural misperceptions have
176. E.g., Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826 (Alaska
1974). In Peters, the court detailed the confusion that Mr. Peters, a Tlingit, had
with the formalities for establishing title. Id. at 833. Though not explicitly stated,
the attention the court gave to that factor indicates that the court may have
believed Peters was entitled to some equitable relief to compensate for his
confusion. Additionally, in the court's analysis of sufficient use, as in Fagerstrom,
it cited to several Native subsistence activities Peters performed on the land. Id.
at 828.
177. Rose, supra note 158, at 741-42 (discussing Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98
(Conn. 1905)).
178. Id. at 742.
179. Epstein, supra note 161, at 1234.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1231.
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played out in determining title to land."s Cronon describes how
the seventeenth century colonists of New England appropriated
much of the Native Americans' land; they justified their actions
based on the assertion that the Natives' land use could never be
sufficient to establish ownership." 3 The Natives of New England
primarily used the land for hunting and gathering purposes, with
women engaging in limited agriculture."s Because mobility was
an essential feature of Native life, the Natives had little reason for
making substantial improvements or thinking of land in terms of
exclusivity."s
This approach was in direct contrast to the colonial concept of
ownership, which conceived of property rights in terms of agricul-
tural improvements8 6 and enclosed parcels."s This "civil" right
of ownership superseded the "natural" rights of the Natives, which
in the opinion of the colonists were insufficient to establish any
type of ownership claim. Thus, the colonists did not see taking the
Natives' property as immoral because they believed that they were
merely civilizing the system of land use in the colonies. Cronon
characterizes this rationalization as an "ideology of conquest."'
s
B. The Alaska Supreme Court's Use of Custom
In a sense, a similar "ideology of conquest" was expressed in
Nome 2000's argument against a finding of hostility in Fagerstrom.
Nome 2000, with the support of an anthropologist, argued that the
Fagerstroms had used the disputed parcel consistently with the
Native Alaskan system of land use, which does not conceive of land
in terms of ownership.8 9 Thus, Nome 2000 argued, the Fager-
stroms could not exhibit the necessary elements to establish an
182. WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND (1983).
183. Id. at 55.
184. Id. at 55-56.
185. Id. at 61.
186. Thus, it appeared to the colonists that only Native women could be
property owners since they were the ones who engaged in agriculture. This was
a difficult concept for the colonists to accept.
187. CRONON, supra note 182, at 56.
188. Id. at 57.
189. Brief for Appellants at 28, Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska
1990) (No. S-3409). The system of land use followed by Native Alaskans is not
claimed to be equivalent to the system adhered to by the Natives of New England.
The analogy to the situation described in Cronon's book is intended solely to
demonstrate a parallel circumstance of cultural misperception.
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adverse claim because they did not regard themselves as own-
ers.
190
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected Nome 2000's hostility
argument, stating that it had "nothing to do with the question
whether the Fagerstroms' possession was hostile."'91 The court
correctly identified Nome 2000's argument as miscast because it
claimed that the Fagerstroms could not acquire title by adverse
possession on the basis of their cultural identity. The implication
of Nome 2000's argument is that Natives could never acquire title
by adverse possession. Such a proposition has no merit. Inevita-
bly, the law will reflect the culture in which it exists. In situations
where legal disputes cross cultural boundaries, however, resolution
requires that one set of cultural values be chosen over the other for
the sake of creating certainty in the law. Thus, instead of a rule
reflecting the Native Alaskan system of land use, a stronger
argument for Nome 2000 would have been that an objective
standard better serves the purpose of the required elements of
adverse possession. Such an objective standard reflects the
traditional Western system of land use and fulfills the purposes
behind the elements of adverse possession by giving notice of an
adverse claim to legal title holders.
The Alaska Supreme Court has previously stated that "adverse
possession must be such that the owner could see that a hostile flag
was being flown over his property."'" One commentator has
presented the requirements of adverse possession as being such that
"an average man, if in the neighborhood" would have notice of
hostile possession. 93 But what about the case where the parties
are from different "neighborhoods," where different "flags" are
used to denote an intent to appropriate land as one's own? Such
is the situation in Fagerstrom. If customs were truly universal, then
all "flags" would be understood. However, where there is the
potential for cultural misperception, the more demanding standard
must be applied in order to ensure that all of the potential parties
could be put on actual notice of the adverse claim. By requiring
actions indicative of possession, rather than mere use, the more
demanding traditional doctrine of adverse possession better
achieves the certainty in the law necessary to give notice to any
190. Id.
191. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 310 (Alaska 1990).
192. Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977).
193. WALSH, supra note 14, at 14.
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legal title holder. Consequently, it meets the primary goal of
adverse possession, which is to provide for security of land
claims. 94
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FAGERSTROM
As time passes, outside factors, such as witnesses dying,
memories fading and deeds being forged or lost, tend to weaken
the claim of the record title holder by reducing the amount of
evidence available to prove his or her ownership.95 The costs of
discovering evidence to determine that the legal title holder still has
good title eventually become so great that it is simply more
efficient to bypass litigation and settle title to the property in favor
of the adverse claimant.'96 This premise underlies the justifica-
tion for statutes of repose in the adverse possession doctrine.'
The declining amount of quality evidence regarding property
ownership creates an increased burden on the legal title holder
which in turn produces a bias in favor of the weaker side, the
adverse claimant.' Similarly, decreasing the burden on the
adverse claimant would create a bias in the claimant's favor. One
way to achieve the proper balance would be to lessen the amount
of objective proof that the claimant would have to present in
support of the adverse claim.
In Fagerstrom, the Alaska Supreme Court reduced the degree
of objective manifestations necessary to establish adverse posses-
sion by "clear and convincing" proof. By accepting customary use
as satisfactory proof of the elements of adverse possession, the
court created greater uncertainty in the law. To some extent,
uncertainty is inevitable when considering rural, semi-wilderness
land, as it is well recognized that a lesser evidentiary showing is
acceptable in light of circumstances which make productive use
more difficult. In many respects, it may even seem to be good
policy to give greater strength to the adverse claimant in such
situations, because it encourages people to attempt to develop rural
land and put it to productive use. However, there is the competing
issue of notice, which is essential to the adverse possession doctrine.
By relaxing the required proof of substantial improvements and
194. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
195. Epstein, supra note 1, at 675.
196. Id. at 676-77.
197. Id. at 677.
198. Id. at 676.
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activities in certain circumstances involving rural, semi-wilderness
land, the Alaska Supreme Court renders unclear what physical
evidence the record title holder (who may likely be unfamiliar with
the Native system of land use) is to look for in determining if there
is an adverse claim being asserted against his land. The court in
Fagerstrom appeared to state that customary use should be a
determining factor.
Customary use might be an attractive solution where it is
sufficiently universal so as to be unambiguous. However, this is not
the case with respect to land use in Alaska, where there are several
distinct cultures. Additionally, custom is better suited for resolving
general problems, and less suitable for settling issues that are highly
fact-specific, such as claims of adverse possession.
The relatively slight extent of actual possession deemed
acceptable for establishing adverse possession by the Fagerstrom
court is repugnant to the ideals of legal ownership. The "average
owner" test was seemingly converted into an "average user"
standard. In so doing, the court institutionalized a system which
allows for less objective proof and makes adverse possession a
more loosely applied doctrine. The Natives of rural Alaska will
now find it less difficult to establish adverse possession.
Therefore, the public policy implications of Fagerstrom should
be considered. In Linck, the Alaska Supreme Court expressly
indicated the policy goals it sought to achieve through the adverse
possession doctrine. The court stated that the adverse possession
doctrine exists "because of a belief 'that title to land should not
long be in doubt, that society will benefit from someone's making
use of land the owner leaves idle, and that third persons who come
to regard the occupant as owner may be protected."'199  The
possible ramifications of Fagerstrom leave some doubt as to
whether the court's new, less demanding objective standard will
fulfill these policy objectives. While it is true that a successful
action for adverse possession leaves no doubt as to who holds title
to the disputed property, it is also evident that a different kind of
uncertainty is created in Fagerstrom. That uncertainty concerns
whether a land user seeks to establish adverse possession in the
first place.
199. Alaska Nat'l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Alaska 1977) (quoting
William B. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L.
REv. 53 (1960)).
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Furthermore, it is unclear that society will benefit from the use
of the kind of land in dispute in Fagerstrom. Generally, when one
considers land use that will benefit society, what comes to mind are
productive or substantial uses that provide society with some
benefit that can be enjoyed by the community as a whole. This
notion likely relates to the concepts of land which the early
American colonists infused into our legal system.2"
With respect to the land at issue in Fagerstrom, as well as
other similar parcels of land, society at large does not gain anything
that it did not already enjoy (for example, the ability to use the
land for recreation) if legal title vests in users such as the Fager-
stroms. In fact, one can picture a long-term scenario where the
implications of the Fagerstrom decision will be to curtail Natives'
free recreational use of rural lands. After Fagerstrom, absent title
holders will likely be much more conscious of protecting their legal
rights, and will be more inclined to exclude potential adverse
claimants from their lands through the use of barricades or fences.
This is particularly true where the legal title holder may be
unfamiliar with the objective manifestations of ownership in
different cultures and wishes to protect against the risk of uncer-
tainty. As a result, it is foreseeable that many Natives could be
"locked out" from lands that they had long believed were open for
the public enjoyment. Such a scenario sheds a different light on
what may at first glance appear to be a decision favoring Native
property rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Alaska Supreme Court does not go so far in
Fagerstrom as to establish a subjective standard for evaluating the
various elements of adverse possession. However, there is a
weakening of the objective standard, and a corresponding emphasis
placed on custom as a source of entitlement. As a result, the court
fails to effectuate the stated purposes of the adverse possession
requirements (for example, notice to the record title holder).
Additionally, a weaker objective standard creates an imbalance in
the law of adverse possession, thereby facilitating the acquisition of
title by adverse claimants. This result conflicts with the notion that
adverse possession is a disfavored remedy. Therefore, the court
needs to adopt definite guidelines for the evidence needed to
200. See supra text accompanying notes 182-88.
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establish adverse possession. Deference to local circumstance
should only arise when all of the parties involved should have
reasonably known of the unique custom. Additionally, where there
is ambiguity as to whether all of the relevant parties were aware of
unique factors in cultural custom, a strict standard must be applied
to adverse possession claims in order to protect the value given to
legal title of property under the law. The court's holding in
Fagerstrom, however, casts doubt upon how strictly the doctrine of
adverse possession is to be construed in Alaska and, corresponding-
ly, on the value to be placed upon the concepts of title and
ownership under Alaska law.
Grantland M. Clapacs
